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Concepts of Extinguishment in the 
Upper Canada Land Surrender 
Treaties, 1764–1862
Jean-Pierre Morin
The views expressed in this communication are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of the Government of Canada.
Introduction
For the past two centuries, the Crown’s interpretation of the Upper Canada Land 
Surrenders has been that they transfer all rights and title, including hunting and 
fishing rights, to the Crown in exchange for payment, without any remaining 
residual rights. In other words, the conclusion of the land surrender treaties consti-
tutes the extinguishment of all rights of the Aboriginal signatories within the 
described lands. With the exception of a few cases where specific reserves were 
created, these land surrender agreements provided no lands within the described 
territory for the use of Aboriginal signatories. By agreeing to the land surrender 
provisions, the Aboriginal people of the Great Lakes Basin alienated themselves 
from these lands for hunting, fishing, cultivation, or other traditional practices. 
Through this alienation, the Crown believed it had total unfettered control over 
these lands, while Aboriginal people were expected to relocate to lands not yet 
surrendered.
Recently, this interpretation, and the scope of the surrenders themselves, has 
been questioned. By examining the language of the treaties, this new interpreta-
tion questions whether all existing Aboriginal rights were surrendered or only 
Aboriginal title. This perspective implies that only the title was surrendered to the 
Crown, while other rights, such as a right to hunt and fish, may still exist. While 
this new view is focused on the language of the treaty documents, it appears to 
ignore the historical context surrounding the negotiation and conclusion of the 
Upper Canada Land Surrenders (UCLS). The terms and language found in the 
texts must be tempered by a close examination of what the parties understood 
them to mean, of the historical context of the period, and of the intent of the 
agreements. Specifically, the issue of “hunting” or “hunting grounds” is one of 
considerable interest. Throughout this period, Aboriginal lands were constantly 
described as “hunting grounds” in official documents and correspondence of the 
Indian Department. In light of this usage, did British colonial officials make any 
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distinction between the “hunting grounds” and Aboriginal title in their policies 
and their practices of treaty-making?
In order to properly ascertain the true nature of these treaties, it is necessary 
to outline the policies that guided the treaty process, the terms of the surrenders 
themselves, and to what the parties believed they were agreeing. Specifically, this 
research will examine the creation and application of the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, which forms the basis for all Aboriginal land cessions, the surrender and 
treaty-making process between 1764 and 1862, as well as the changing relation-
ship between the parties during this period. While a general examination of the 
UCLS process is required, four specific treaties will be used as case studies. These 
treaties, concluded at different times during the treaty process, are similar in nature 
but unique either because of specific clauses, or because of the implementation 
of the treaty terms. These treaties are: the 1790 McKee Treaty, the 1796 Chenail 
Écarté and 1827 Huron Tract treaties, which will be examined together, and the 
Rice Lake Purchase of 1818. In all four treaties, there is specific language dealing 
with the nature of the land surrendered, such as the scope of the land, the usage of 
the land, or the reserving of lands. These treaties, as well as their negotiation and 
implementation, are useful examples of the differing views and understandings of 
the concept of land surrender in Upper Canada.
Royal Proclamation
The arrival of the first permanent European settlements brought a new system 
of land tenure to North America. Specifically, European land tenure introduced 
individual land ownership as well as Crown lands to the New World. As settlers 
arrived in the colonies, the lands were subdivided and allotted, through grant or 
purchase, to individuals who were to farm and develop them. Before these lands 
could be opened and settled, however, the title of the land needed to be held by the 
Crown. The various European powers had different views as to how to attain title. 
For France and Spain, discovery of new lands and a symbolic possession-taking, 
such as the raising of crosses, were sufficient to accord the territorial rights of 
the land to the discovering state. The British and Dutch, however, so as to ensure 
peaceful relations and safety within the lands of their colonies, negotiated land 
purchase agreements with the Aboriginal inhabitants in exchange for goods as 
well as military and trade alliances.1
All of the British colonies established along the Atlantic coast were somewhat 
independent one from the other. The Home Government, however, maintained an 
overall administration of various issues, most notably relating to colonial trade 
and commerce, as well as overall defence of the colonies. As the security of the 
colonies was always a pressing issue, either from French or Aboriginal threats, 
British administrators wanted to regularize the relations between the new settle-
ments and their Aboriginal neighbours. In 1670, Parliament passed an act prohib-
iting any violence against Aboriginal populations, their “people, goods or posses-
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sions.”2 The main purpose of this legislation was not so much to limit the growth 
of the colonies, but rather to ensure peaceful and friendly relations. It proved to 
be an ineffective tool, however, and impossible to enforce due to the vagueness of 
the act as well as the colonies’ desire for new lands. By the end of the seventeenth 
century, a new administrative body, the Committee of the Lords of Trade and Plan-
tations (referred to as the Board or Lords of Trade) gradually assumed a greater 
role in the administration of commerce between Britain and the Americas, as well 
as regularizing the British fur trade in the interior.3 By the mid-eighteenth century, 
the position of the Lords of Trade shifted from a mere oversight committee to 
the leading decision makers of colonial policy.4 This concentration also led to 
the consolidation of British policy regarding Indian affairs, and eventually, land 
policies in America.
The Lords of Trade were limited in their ability to effectively control the activi-
ties and actions of the colonies. Because of the quasi-independent nature of the 
colonies, colonial legislature and governors were responsible for the orderly 
settlement of their colony, including the subdivision of lands and dealing with the 
Aboriginal people who lived within its boundaries. As the population of colonies 
such as New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania grew, so did their desire to increase 
their land base, which could only be done through the acquisition of Aboriginal 
lands. From colony to colony, the protocols for acquiring these lands differed. 
On the whole, acquisitions were based on the concept of a signed deed with an 
Aboriginal person or group. Who had the authority to sign, however, varied, and 
agreements could be elaborate ceremonies between governors and Aboriginal 
groups, or concluded by private land companies or land speculators.5 Because of 
the lack of uniformity, not only between colonies but also within a colony, conflict 
between Aboriginal people and unscrupulous land-jobbers became increasingly 
frequent.
With the growth of the colonies, land usage pushed available hunting lands 
continuously westward, disrupting Aboriginal hunting and gathering.6 British 
concerns over the rampant and uncontrolled land purchases focused primarily on 
its relationship with its Aboriginal trading partners and allies. The expansion of 
the colonies pushed the frontier west, and in consequence reduced the number of 
hunting grounds available to Aboriginal hunters, forcing them to go further afield 
to meet European demand for furs.7 The fear of losing fur trade relationships to 
the French at Montreal due to displeasure at the loss of hunting grounds worried 
the Lords of Trade, as did the impact of uncontrolled land purchases upon the 
delicate military alliances made with the Iroquois Confederacy and other groups. 
As the threat of French military action remained high, the shady land deals and 
growing encroachments upon Aboriginal lands were being seen as a direct threat 
to the safety and viability of Britain’s North American colonies.
The territorial expansions of the colonies of New York and Pennsylvania were 
of great concern to the Iroquois Confederacy. Numerous complaints from Iroquois 
sachems were heard by British officials in Albany, which had begun to attract 
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settlers looking for new agricultural lands, in the 1700s.8 In 1742, an Onondaga 
chief, Canasseteego, while admitting that some members of his band had sold 
lands without the consent of the group as a whole, called upon the British to 
protect their land interest as they were “not well used with respect to the lands 
still unsold by us. Your People daily settle on these Lands and spoil our Hunting.”9 
These complaints, however, had little impact upon the movement of settlers into 
the area as both New York and Pennsylvania continued to approve all manner of 
land deeds.
As Jack Stagg noted, by the 1740s, “an awareness developed among British 
officials in North America that a more rational, uniform, and most importantly, 
better coordinated policy for governing colonial Indian relations was needed.”10 
Attempts were made at two colonial conferences in Albany in 1745 and 1753 to 
develop a more effective policy for defence and Aboriginal affairs. The second 
conference report recommended a series of administrative changes, including the 
unification of the colonies under one administration, and a uniform policy on the 
purchase of Aboriginal lands. It also recommended that only lands purchased by 
colonial officials be recognized and all private purchases be voided. Finally, the 
western boundaries of the colonies would be repudiated and all complaints be 
“speedily investigated.”11
Upon review of the conference report, the Board of Trade saw merit in the 
sections relating to Indian affairs. Specifically, it agreed that a central administra-
tion for Indian affairs in the colony could be beneficial, especially as such a body 
would address issues that crossed colonial boundaries and thereby costs could 
be shared. The outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in North America prompted 
the military establishment, which perceived Indian affairs as its responsibility, to 
move ahead with these recommendations. In 1755, William Johnson and Edmund 
Atkins were appointed superintendents for Indian affairs, Johnson in the northern 
colonies and Atkins in the south.12 At their inception, these administrative units, 
collectively called the Indian Department, had a largely military purpose: to 
secure Aboriginal allies against the French. In the northern department, William 
Johnson was responsible for the Confederacy and all Aboriginal groups of the 
Ohio Valley.13 As the conflict spread throughout the northern colonies, Johnson 
was able to address the land encroachment issues of the Confederacy and bring 
them back to the British ranks. Confederacy and other Aboriginal warriors played 
no small part in the ongoing war and were a valuable asset in Britain’s eventual 
victory over their French rivals.
William Johnson’s success in rallying the Six Nations to the British cause is 
largely attributable to his efforts to ease Iroquois concerns regarding encroach-
ments upon their lands. In a 1756 letter, Johnson stated that the “deprivation of 
what [the Indians] deem their property was the chief cause of their Indifference 
in our Quarrel.”14 By 1759, Johnson continued to push for the development of 
a firm policy to address the questions of trade and Aboriginal land,15 while the 
commander of the British military in North America, General Amherst, was 
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preparing to expropriate lands in the Great Lakes region for demobilized soldiers, 
a common military practice.16 Fearing a general uprising by the Aboriginal popu-
lation in the interior, the Board of Trade was reluctant to proceed with this plan. 
The Board stressed that proper attention had to be given to the interests of Aborig-
inal people in that region:
The first of these points is essentially necessary to be [known] ... in reference to our 
engagement with the Indians, who may possibly claim part of the [lands to be granted] 
as their hunting grounds reserved to them by the most solemn treaties upon exact obser-
vance of which, not only our Interests, but our Rights in regard to the Claims of other 
foreign powers do greatly depend.17 (emphasis added)
The Board of Trade was concerned that the grant would take place on land that 
had not been properly surrendered to the Crown through an orderly treaty, and 
that such an action would be seen as a land grab by the British at a time when 
they had no capacity to hold the frontier if a full revolt occurred. By disallowing 
Amherst’s land grant plan, the Board of Trade was protecting their allies’ claim of 
the territory and limiting the chances of conflict on the newly conquered frontier. 
The Board of Trade’s reaction to General Amherst’s proposed settlement of 
soldiers became its general rule regarding all land purchases and encroachments 
upon Aboriginal hunting grounds in the colonies. Fearing a general uprising in the 
colonies if these issues were not addressed quickly, the Board of Trade recognized 
that the security and prosperity of the colonies depended directly on the continu-
ance of good relations with Aboriginal peoples.18 In December 1761, a circular of 
instruction was sent to governors proscribing a halt to all land grants on Aborigi-
nal lands, the removal of all squatters, and Board of Trade approval for all future 
purchases of Aboriginal lands.19 These instructions marked a new approach by 
Britain in Aboriginal relations—by taking control of land grants in Aboriginal 
territories, they effectively reduced the colonies’ ability to expand territorially 
without check. The 1761 Instructions signalled the beginning of a centralized 
administration of Aboriginal affairs, which would only increase following the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763.
In the months prior to the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the Home 
Government used this opportunity to examine how best to administer its new North 
American territories as well as its Indian policy. The Board of Trade incorporated 
the opinions of both officials in the field and those within the Home Government 
to further its discussion. In a 1759 letter, Sir William Johnson recommended a 
strong central administration to deal with Aboriginal issues, such as alliances, 
treaties, and trade. He also recommended that a firm boundary be created between 
the areas of settlement and Aboriginal lands.20  Both Johnson and Lord Egremont, 
secretary of state for the southern department, wrote letters expounding the need 
to secure peace with Aboriginal people by halting expansion of settlement and 
pulling troops out of frontier posts.21 One document among Egremont’s papers, 
entitled “Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and 
newly acquired Countries in America,” outlines recommendations for the gover-
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nance, control, and administration of the colonies.22 Several specific recommen-
dations addressed problems with Indian policy, such as the creation of a fixed 
boundary line between settlement and Aboriginal lands as well as the centraliza-
tion of Indian affairs.23 
Egremont sent this paper, along with other recommendations, to the Board of 
Trade on May 5, 1763. He also asked the advice of the Board with respect to the 
governments to be created in North America, sources of colonial revenue and 
military establishments, and the need of “Preservation of the internal Peace and 
Tranquility of the Country against any Indian Disturbances.”24 The secretary of 
state also wrote that the goal of the government was:
conciliating the Indians by protecting their Persons & Property & securing to them all 
Possessions, Rights and Priviledges they have hitherto enjoyed, & are entitled to, most 
cautiously guarding against any Invasion or occupation of their Hunting Lands, the 
Possession of which is to acquired by fair Purchase only.25 (emphasis added)
Just as Johnson had expressed in his 1759 letter to the Board, Egremont’s view 
was that in order to protect Britain’s position in North America it was necessary 
to defend Aboriginal interests in the interior, specifically their hunting grounds, by 
halting settlement and securing a process for future land acquisitions.
On June 8, the Board responded with a report that incorporated most of Egre-
mont’s recommendations. On the whole, the report consolidated the practices 
that were already put in place, and was a fusion of “the mercantilist rationale of 
the ‘Hints’ paper with Egremont’s exhortation of the need for ‘conciliating’ the 
Indians through the protection of their lands.”26  The June 8 report held all of the 
major elements that would be included in the October proclamation. It created a 
territory that was open to trade, but where no grants of land or settlement could be 
made.27 A few months later, after official approval by Cabinet, on October 7, 1763, 
the British monarch issued a Royal Proclamation establishing a new administra-
tive structure for the newly acquired territories in North America, as well as new 
rules and protocols for future relations with Aboriginal people.28
With respect to the clauses dealing with Aboriginal affairs, the ultimate purpose 
was to protect Aboriginal interests to land in order to assure peaceful relations 
between Aboriginal people and settlers. The Proclamation declared all Indian 
lands within the colonies to be “reserve lands” by establishing that lands west of 
the Allegheny Mountain divide “which, not having been ceded to, or purchased 
by Us ... are reserved to the said Indians.” 29 This declaration created a separate 
territory, outside the jurisdiction of colonial administrators, where the Indian 
Department could operate without interference. The Proclamation also specified 
that the various Aboriginal peoples were under the Crown’s protection and that 
they “should not be molested or disturbed in their Possession of such Parts of our 
Dominions and Territorys as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are 
reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.” While removing 
anyone but the agents of the Indian Department from interacting with Aboriginal 
people, the Royal Proclamation also reinforced the distinctions between settlement 
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lands and Aboriginal lands. This explicit recognition of the “Indian Territory” as 
a reserve for the hunting practices of North America’s Aboriginal population was 
a response to the numerous complaints that settlement and encroachment were 
having a negative impact upon their ability to hunt, for trade or sustenance.30
The primary goal of the Indian affairs clauses was to halt all new settlement 
and encroachment onto Aboriginal hunting grounds. In an examination of the 
intention of the Proclamation, F. Murray Greenwood comments that the prohibi-
tion on acquiring lands applied not only to private individuals, but also to colonial 
governments.31 Furthermore, by enforcing the prohibition in the Proclamation, 
the Home Government was looking to secure the interior of North America by 
limiting encroachment, and to reopen the fur trade and commerce disrupted by 
the war by protecting hunting grounds. While its goal was self-serving, the Crown 
openly recognized that the Aboriginal populations of North America held rights 
to lands used for their livelihood and survival. These rights were to be protected 
and were only alienable to the Crown. Just as the Royal Proclamation reinforced 
the ban on the acquisition of Aboriginal lands established in 1761, it also estab-
lished a process whereby official agents of the Crown would undertake the formal 
acquisition of lands when Aboriginal groups were willing to sell them.32 As 
states Robert Surtees, “while the Royal Proclamation was certainly an important 
weapon in preserving the right of Indians to occupy and use their lands, it must 
also be seen as providing a method for removing that right by means of a formal 
purchase by the Crown.”33 By including these protocols within the Proclamation, 
the Crown gave itself a way to proceed with an orderly and systematic acquisi-
tion of Aboriginal lands that would limit any possible conflict, allow for minimal 
impact upon the fur trade, and control the rate of colonial territorial growth. At 
their core, the land cession protocols were written to strengthen the defence of the 
colonies by addressing the issues and complaints of Britain’s Aboriginal military 
allies. By doing so, Britain was able to rebuild the relationship with its military 
and commercial allies by halting all encroachment to their lands, all the while 
preparing a process to acquire Aboriginal hunting grounds when it saw fit to do so.
Upper Canada Land Surrenders Policy
The creation of the Indian Territory and the new protocols for the acquisition 
of Aboriginal lands introduced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 necessitated 
the development of new policies and administrative structure for Indian affairs. 
As responsibility for maintaining the relationship and alliances fell to the newly 
mandated Indian Department, the influence of individual colonies fell away and 
shifted to the superintendents of the Indian Department. Sir William Johnson held 
near total control over Indian affairs and dealt directly with the Lords of Trade. 
Johnson’s view on Indian matters was that Britain had only two options: either 
wiping out the Aboriginal population through a military campaign or strengthen-
ing the existing alliances through trade and good treatment.34 He was certain that 
the British did not have the military capacity in North America to engage in an all-
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out war, nor could they hold onto their forts and trading posts without the coop-
eration of Aboriginal people. The only way that Britain’s interests in the interior 
could be protected was through a strengthened relationship based on mutually 
beneficial trade and peaceful relations.
In the first decade after the Proclamation, the policies and positions of the 
Indian Department and colonial administrators were to follow Johnson’s advice 
of limiting and controlling all contact between settlers and Aboriginal people. 
While encroachment continued to be an issue along the Ohio frontier and in the 
lands west of Virginia, in the Great Lakes Basin, the boundary line imposed in 
1763 held fast mostly because of a lack of interest in the lands north of the St. 
Lawrence River and the instructions prohibiting any settlement. Without any 
real pressure, the hunting grounds of the Lower Great Lakes remained largely 
untouched. The only European activity allowed within the Indian Territory was to 
be trade. In July of 1764, the Lords of Trade presented a new policy framework 
for Indian affairs called the “Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs.” 
The future plan focused on “the regulation of Indian Affairs both commercial; 
and political throughout all North America, upon one general system, under the 
direction of Officers appointed by the Crown so as to set aside all local interfering 
of Particular Provinces.”35 It reopened the interior to trade, outlined the structure 
and responsibilities of the Indian Department, and reiterated the protocols for the 
cession of Aboriginal lands to the Crown.
Just as the Proclamation and various instructions to colonial governors had 
stated, the acquisition of Aboriginal lands was to be strictly controlled by the 
Indian Department. As John Borrows states, the “British approach committed the 
Crown to entering into treaties with Aboriginal peoples if their lands were to be 
occupied by non-Aboriginal people … The Crown was bound to secure Aborigi-
nal consent before occupying Aboriginal lands.”36 In the first decade after the 
Proclamation, however, the few land purchases concluded focused on the military 
and security needs of the colonies. The first land cession under the protocols of the 
Proclamation was concluded between Johnson and the Seneca. In this 1764 treaty, 
the Seneca ceded two miles on either side of the Niagara River to the British. For 
the British, this acquisition was to secure communication between Lakes Erie 
and Ontario as well as manage the relationship with its Aboriginal allies. As the 
negotiations in July 1764 were attended by representatives of some twenty-four 
different Aboriginal groups, Johnson seized the occasion to discuss a variety 
of issues with them, from land encroachment, to trade, to inter-tribal warfare.37 
He also attempted to strengthen military and trade relations by renewing an old 
alliance, referred to as the “Covenant Chain.” The cession of the four-mile strip of 
land along the Niagara River is only one of many different aspects of the nearly 
month-long discussions. For Johnson, the Treaty at Niagara was a renewal of 
alliances, restitution of prisoners and trade losses, and the acquisition of a British 
foothold in the Great Lakes Basin.38
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From the Aboriginal perspective, the negotiations leading up to the cession 
may well have been different. Borrows, in his examination of the 1764 Treaty of 
Niagara, suggests that the negotiations were not only about restoring the relation-
ship, but also Aboriginal people accepting the principles of the Royal Proclama-
tion.39 Only by accepting the principles of land cession presented in the Proclama-
tion could the surrender of the four-mile strip of land be valid. While he does push 
his argument to call the Proclamation itself a treaty, a disputed point, Borrows’s 
reasoning that the land surrender principles of the Proclamation had to have been 
understood by the Aboriginal parties to the treaty is of considerable relevance 
here. William Johnson had gone to great lengths to disseminate copies of the 
Proclamation throughout the Indian Territory and presented the clauses to the 
Iroquois Confederacy himself in December 1763.40 If Aboriginal parties accepted 
the land cession clauses of the Proclamation, they also accepted the definition of 
the Indian Territory as their hunting grounds, which could be sold to the Crown. 
This acceptance of the principles of land cessions was again demonstrated in 1768 
at Fort Stanwix when Johnson negotiated the boundary line between the northern 
colonies and the Indian Territory.41 While the Proclamation had stated the Allegh-
enies divide as the boundary, Johnson successfully negotiated a boundary further 
west, the Ohio River, because of pre-existing settlements in the area.
Only three valid land surrenders were concluded between the Indian Depart-
ment and Aboriginal groups between 1764 and 1783.42 The three treaties were 
very specific in nature and were more for security than settlement. As fear of 
an uprising remained and Johnson continued to remind colonial administrators 
of the threat, the initial Indian policy was centred on maintaining peaceful and 
friendly relations with Aboriginal peoples. To this effect, colonial governors and 
military commanders issued instructions and directives restating the protocols 
of the Proclamation and reminding all that the Indian Department was the body 
responsible for issues relating to Indian affairs.43 While the intent of this policy 
may have been the protection of British interests against Aboriginal uprising or 
the threat from another European power, the strengthened relationship proved to 
be vital in the colonial conflict between the American colonies. The British called 
upon its military allies, specifically the Six Nations, to assist in putting down the 
American rebels especially in the interior where British forces were small and 
scattered. While their efforts were ultimately for a futile cause, the conclusion 
of the American War of Independence marked a shift in the relationship between 
Aboriginal people and the British Crown. Faced with a new threat in North 
America, the military role of Aboriginal people was of considerable importance 
to the British, while colonial administrators shifted their attention to the lands of 
the Lower Great Lakes to meet settlement needs.
The recognition of the United States of America in the 1783 Treaty of Paris 
created two specific issues for British colonial administrators: first, the defence of 
the colony against the new American threat; and second, the arrival of some thirty 
thousand Loyalist refugees into the colony of Quebec. British military command-
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ers believed that it was in Britain’s best interests to maintain its long-standing 
military alliances in the North American interior so long as the United States 
remained a threat to British interests. British officials also wanted to rebuild the 
damaged relationship after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783.44 It was 
believed that only by maintaining a strong presence in the Great Lakes could 
Britain assure its protection. For this reason, British troops remained in the posts 
throughout the Old Northwest, although clearly in American territory, so as to 
maintain links with their allies. Officials from the Indian Department, such as 
Alexander McKee, worked out of these posts to rebuild alliances. With thousands 
of refugees fleeing the Thirteen Colonies, colonial administrators in Quebec 
initially attempted to settle them in the Maritimes and in the Eastern Townships 
of Quebec. The lands in the townships, however, were insufficient for the number 
of refugees and many coveted the western lands in the Indian Territory, which 
were similar to those they had abandoned. The new governor general of Quebec, 
Frederick Haldimand, had the added concern of maintaining the integrity of 
Britain’s North American holdings. He surmised that in order to secure the Great 
Lakes from any American threat, it was important to develop settlement around 
the military posts such as Cataraqui (Kingston) and Niagara. After appealing to 
the Home Government for approval of his settlement plan, Haldimand instructed 
the Indian Department to negotiate the surrenders.45 He was, however, mindful of 
the fears and concerns of Aboriginal people. He wanted to minimize any conflict 
through upfront land purchases in advance of the arrival of settlers.
The first of these new treaties, signed in 1783 and 1784 at the Bay of Quinte and 
Niagara, represented a shift away from the isolationism created by the Royal Proc-
lamation. Whereas after 1763, the Indian Department worked towards isolating 
Aboriginal people and settlers, the outcome of the War of Independence changed 
their focus. Now, in order to safeguard British holdings in the Great Lakes area, 
Indian agents were working to bring landless Loyalist refugees, who could in 
time of crisis, act as a militia, into Indian country. While Haldimand did recognize 
the need to protect Aboriginal lands from encroachment, by the mid-1780s, he 
knew that more lands were needed to accommodate the needs of the Loyalists.46 
Political pressure from the upper levels of colonial society was also a factor in 
Britain’s decision to resume land acquisitions in the Indian Territory. People such 
as William Dummer Powell, judge and future member of the executive council 
of Upper Canada, stated that Loyalists were anxious to settle in the Great Lakes 
region and that such settlements would induce more Loyalists still in the United 
States to migrate north.47 This settler population, through the militia, in conjunction 
with Aboriginal allies such as the Six Nations on the Grand River and American 
Indians, would prove to be an effective defence of British holdings.
The acquisition of Aboriginal hunting grounds was deemed necessary for the 
survival of the British colonies, but it needed to be balanced with the protec-
tion of Aboriginal interests and the military alliances. So long as the American 
threat remained, colonial administrators such as Sir John Johnson and Sir Guy 
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Carleton, who returned as governor general under the title Lord Dorchester in 
1786, attempted to limit possible conflict in the interior. Dorchester believed that 
the primary nature of the relationship with Aboriginal people was a military one 
and that any land purchases for settlement had to be limited and tightly controlled 
so as to prevent any deterioration of the military alliance.48 During his tenure 
as governor general, Dorchester, because of his active role in defending Quebec 
from the American Revolutionaries, believed the new Republic to be a threat to 
British interests in North America. He therefore wanted to keep Britain’s military 
allies at the ready to repel the anticipated American invasion. This view was not 
universally shared by all colonial administrators. John Graves Simcoe, the first 
lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada in 1792, firmly believed that the military 
had no role to play in the development of the colony and that the military control 
over Indian affairs was impeding the growth of Upper Canada.49 Simcoe clashed 
with Dorchester because he wanted control over Indian affairs in the Great Lakes 
so that he could move ahead with his plan of increased settlement throughout the 
region. These two competing perspectives would continue to impact the ongoing 
relationship between the Crown and its Aboriginal allies as well as their access to 
hunting grounds.
As had occurred in the American colonies prior to the 1761 Instructions, 
colonial interests began to take precedent over the need to maintain the military 
alliances. Colonial administrators and local land speculators pressed the Indian 
Department into making treaties for lands that could then be used for settlement.50 
Delays in the allocation of lands to settlers, however, led to a considerable amount 
of squatting throughout the colony, both on acquired lands and unsurrendered 
Aboriginal lands.51 To respond to this problem, land boards comprised of local 
administrators and representatives of both the military and the Indian Department, 
such as Alexander McKee and Sir John Johnson, were created in 1788 to coor-
dinate the issuance of land patents to settlers, to administer the newly acquired 
lands, and to decide any disputes and illegal patents. Initially four boards were 
created, with three more established in 1792. The purpose of having such diverse 
representation on the boards was to assure respect of trade interests, proper coor-
dination of defensive needs, and maintenance of proper relations with the area’s 
Aboriginal population.52
These land boards fit in well with Britain’s overall Indian policy. The main 
goal of the policy was to advance British interests throughout the interior, and the 
land boards were meant to stabilize settlement and preserve Aboriginal interest by 
limiting squatting on unceded hunting grounds. In his study of the land board’s 
dealing in the District of Hess, John Clark showed that members of the land board 
would call upon the Indian Department’s representatives on the board to secure 
the title of Aboriginal lands well before these lands were needed for settlement.53 
In many cases, land purchases made by the Indian Department followed those 
recommendations. Before the outbreak of the War of 1812, sixteen land surrender 
treaties were negotiated with the largely Ojibway people of the Great Lakes region. 
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These treaties, such as the London Purchase in 1796, Penetanguishene Harbour 
Purchase in 1798, and the Head of the Lake and Toronto Purchases of 1805–06, 
corresponded with Upper Canada’s military and settlement needs. Through these 
purchases, strategic military posts were secured, lands along the St. Lawrence and 
the Thames rivers were opened for settlement, and trade routes were opened into 
the interior.54
While the Proclamation and colonial instructions regarding the protocols for 
taking land surrenders in Upper Canada were specific and detailed, their applica-
tion on the ground was not always as clear-cut. Several elements of the established 
protocols were respected, specifically the need for an official of the Indian Depart-
ment to conduct the negotiations in a public manner with those Aboriginal people 
who were believed to hold land interests. Other elements, however, were not, as 
Peter Schmalz explains in his study of the Ojibway in southern Ontario. He identi-
fies three main problems with these treaties: the description of the lands purchased 
were often vague; cessions from a specific group often covered lands used by 
others; and some groups surrendered lands to which they held no interests.55
The principal source of these problems lay with the bureaucracy and adminis-
tration of the Indian Department. In many cases, the reports and treaty documents 
contained erroneous descriptions of the lands, repeated inconsistencies of place 
names and geography, or the documentation was simply lost and treaties were 
based on secondary accounts.56 While colonial administrators at the time recog-
nized that some of the treaties may be flawed, they wanted the “principles of 
honour, justice and upright dealings” to be respected. When problems were recog-
nized, attempts were made to resolve the situation through communication with 
the signatories, and in some cases, the negotiation of a new treaty, such as in 
1798 when Governor General Prescott ordered a new land cession agreement be 
concluded with the Mississauga along Lake Ontario.57 While gaining certainty 
over the land purchases was a goal of the Indian Department, colonial officials 
also wanted to limit encroachment by clearly identifying ceded lands. Squatting 
on unceded lands did not, however, change the nature of the title.58 These lands 
remained part of the “Indian Reserve” created by the Royal Proclamation and 
only through valid surrender could the “hunting grounds” described in the Proc-
lamation become Crown lands for settlement. This principle was reiterated by 
colonial officials throughout the period. In 1792, lieutenant-governor of Upper 
Canada, John Graves Simcoe, although a proponent of more surrenders, stated 
that the Aboriginal population retained their rights and usage to lands in Upper 
Canada except on those they surrendered to the Crown through treaty.59
As the Indian Department continued with its piecemeal acquisition of lands 
throughout the Great Lakes Basin, they followed a clear goal of slowly opening 
the land to settlement without disrupting the vital military alliances with Aborigi-
nal people. Indian officials attempted to protect Aboriginal rights over hunting 
lands by preventing encroachment on unsurrendered areas. As Peter Schmalz 
sums up:
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From the British point of view, this system of Indian land cession was almost ideal. The 
land was piece by piece taken over by the use of presents, which were necessary anyway 
to keep the Indians as allies. Land was obtained at a small expense … and British loyalty 
was enhanced by each of the early transactions.60
The largely Ojibway population in Upper Canada had a somewhat different 
perspective of these land cession treaties. As the British showed interest in 
acquiring those lands, they had several reasons for agreeing to sell. Mostly, 
they wanted the flow of British presents to continue after the War of Independ-
ence. Also, as suggested by Donald Smith in his study of the alienation of the 
Mississauga lands in Ontario, the Ojibway may not have fully understood that 
the cessions meant the full surrender of all lands and rights. According to Smith, 
“they had no concept of such a surrender, and they were assured that they could 
‘encamp and fish where they pleased.’”61 Furthermore, as the various groups were 
small and weakly organized, the treaty payments and presents may have been seen 
as an immediate benefit to selling their lands.
In the first decades of land cession treaties in Upper Canada, there was rela-
tively little impact upon the Aboriginal signatories. Until the 1810s, the majority 
of British settlement was concentrated in small pockets along the St. Lawrence 
River, at the Toronto Carrying Place, Niagara, and the St. Clair River, and was 
dwarfed by the Aboriginal population, making relations fairly easy to maintain. 
In this early period, both the British and the various Ojibway groups believed 
they were benefiting from the land cessions.62 The British colonial administra-
tion believed they had secured the transfer of the rights and title to the lands for 
the Crown at a minimal cost while preserving the military relationship with its 
allies. On the other hand, Aboriginal signatories were receiving extra payments 
on top of the yearly presents issued by the British. So long as Aboriginal warriors 
were required as part of the defensive needs of the colony, the overall goal of 
the policy remained the same. Continued tension between Britain and the United 
States forced military and Indian Department officials to maintain good relations 
with Aboriginal allies.63 The Indian Department’s balancing of this defensive 
requirement and the need for settlement lands was a constant concern.64 Although 
Aboriginal signatories may have parted with parcels of land, they still retained 
access to other hunting grounds for their use and occupation. Furthermore, 
military interests meant that Aboriginal warriors needed to be fairly close at hand 
and near the border, in case there was a requirement to call upon their assistance. 
These circumstances led Indian policy and Indian agents to keep settlement in 
check and to protect Aboriginal people’s land interest. Aboriginal involvement in 
the War of 1812 clearly showed that the Indian Department was able to maintain 
the traditional military alliance and Aboriginal loyalty to the British cause.
The end of the war in 1815, however, brought about a new reality. Maintain-
ing a strong military alliance with Aboriginal people was no longer the primary 
concern of British administrators and the Indian Department. While it was still 
necessary to follow the protocols established by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
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the rate of treaty-making increased in this postwar period to accommodate the 
growing number of settlers, a population which quickly outnumbered Aborigi-
nal people. The policies that had guided the Indian Department to maintain 
Aboriginal warriors in close proximity to military positions were refocused to 
isolating Aboriginal peoples from settlements. The patchwork of land cessions of 
the previous decades encumbered settlement. Unsurrendered Aboriginal hunting 
grounds were seen as untapped agricultural lands being wasted by underdevelop-
ment.65 As land acquisition became the primary focus of the Indian Department, 
the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal people began to change. The 
Aboriginal population was no longer seen as a whole but rather as small isolated 
groups that needed to be “civilized” and converted to Christianity.66 Once seen as 
vital to the protection of the colonies, Aboriginal people were seen as an impedi-
ment to colonial growth and wealth.
Each new land cession alienated another parcel of hunting grounds from Aborig-
inal usage; once lands were purchased, Aboriginal signatories were expected to 
relocate to unceded territories or reserve lands specified by treaty.67 While there 
had been considerable lands available around the Lower Great Lakes prior to the 
War of 1812, by the 1830s the increased rate of land cession treaties led to a rapid 
decrease in the ability of Aboriginal people to hunt and fish, as they were limited to 
the remaining available lands and small reserves set aside by the Crown.68 Access 
to the remaining Aboriginal hunting grounds was further impeded by the land 
patent system of Upper Canada, which prevented trespass across those private 
farmlands.69 Even by the turn of the eighteenth century, various groups had begun 
to realize the impact of their earlier land cessions. In 1797, the Mississauga of the 
Credit refused a request by the Indian Department to sell lands in Burlington Bay 
because they feared losing their remaining hunting grounds.70 Six Nations leader 
Joseph Brant recommended to the Indian Department that the Mississauga be 
allowed to “retain some of their Lands, for unless they do, they certainly will be 
beggars.” Eight years later, the Mississauga did surrender their remaining lands 
to the Crown. The concerns of the Mississauga of the Credit were widespread 
throughout the Aboriginal population of Upper Canada. In roughly half a century, 
the Aboriginal people of southern Ontario went from the dominant military power 
in the area to a hindrance to colonial development. A statement by a Mississauga 
chief to a British traveller in 1820, and recounted by Donald Smith, poetically 
summarizes this transformation:
You [the British] came as wind blown across the Great Lake. The wind wafted you to 
our shores, we received you—we planted you—we nursed you. We protected you till 
you became a mighty tree that spread thro our Hunting Lands. With its branches you 
now lash us.71
There is debate as to whether Aboriginal signatories understood the full meaning 
of the Upper Canada Land Surrender treaties. Robert Surtees postulated that those 
who agreed to sell their lands to the Crown during the late eighteenth century 
did not understand that the treaties represented the complete abandonment of 
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their rights over the lands in question.72 This ignorance of the meaning of the 
surrenders likely did not last very long as the lines of communication between the 
different groups remained open throughout this period, such as during the annual 
gatherings to receive presents from the British at key posts. Over the course of the 
century-long process, different Aboriginal groups had contact with those already 
dispossessed of their hunting grounds and could see the negative effects of settlers 
through loss of access to natural resources. None of these elements led to any true 
refusals to cede land to the Crown when requested to do so. It is likely, as Peter 
Schmalz suggests, that “rather than cross-cultural ignorance of land use, it was a 
need for trade goods, a feeling of trust, a certain degree of loyalty, and especially 
a lack of alternatives,” which pushed Aboriginal people to agree to sell their lands 
for one-time payments and small annuities.73
Case Studies
While the policies of the Indian Department regarding land cession treaties were 
to be applied in the same manner for all agreements, the reality of the individual 
negotiations proved to be somewhat different. From the earliest treaties, the Indian 
agents needed to adapt their interpretation of these policies to each individual 
case, all the while maintaining the principles of fair dealings and protocols estab-
lished by the Royal Proclamation. British motivation for undertaking these treaty 
negotiations shifted with colonial priorities during this ninety-eight-year period. 
In the earlier period, the focus of these treaties started with a policy of isolation, 
keeping settlers out of Aboriginal hunting grounds in order to maintain a strong 
military alliance, and transformed into a policy of displacement through which the 
Indian Department pushed Aboriginal people to surrender their lands for settle-
ment purposes and relocated them elsewhere. While examining and tracking the 
language and negotiations of each of the thirty-two Upper Canada Land Surrender 
treaties would be the best way to see if the concept of the surrender of rights 
and access to lands were consistent during this period, such a task is beyond the 
scope of this current project. Instead, four specific treaties throughout the period 
are examined to see if the language and interpretation of British policy regarding 
Aboriginal hunting grounds remained consistent with the distinctions made by the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763.
1. The 1790 McKee Treaty
In the summer of 1790, Alexander McKee, the Indian agent at Detroit, concluded 
the purchase of a tract of land with the Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the area. As 
one of the earliest treaties in the post-War of Independence era, McKee’s treaty 
was specifically undertaken to open the lands between Lakes Erie and St. Clair 
to settlement. This land cession was but one treaty of many negotiated to deal 
with land requirements of the nearly thirty thousand Loyalist refugees.74 In 1788, 
Governor General Dorchester subdivided the proposed settlements into districts 
around the Great Lakes Basin, from east to west: Lunenburg, Mecklenburg, 
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Nassau, and Hess. It was hoped that land grants and settlement would be facili-
tated, as each district would have its own land board “which was to function as an 
intermediary between the governor and the governed.”75
For the Hess district, including the territory between Lakes Erie and St. Clair, 
surveys of the area had already begun in 1785 and the first townships were laid out 
as of 1789 and continued for the next decade.76 Illegal land acquisition by settlers 
had, however, preceded these surveys and the establishment of the land board 
itself. The Hess Land Board, fully aware that it could not issue title to settlers until 
a cession had been made by the local Aboriginal people, instead issued location 
certificates to Loyalists and reduced military officers, 121 concessions in total. In 
a letter to Governor General Dorchester, the land board stated that
none of the Lands within the limits of this District [Hess] have been purchased from the 
Indians for the Crown, although they have been parcelled out in large grants to individu-
als by the Natives, so as to leave no unclaimed from Long Point on Lake Erie to Lake 
Huron.77
That same year, the board produced a report for the governor general describing 
the Indian lands that should be included in the next treaty—the entire area between 
Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie and west of the lands surrendered by the Mississauga 
in 1784. The following May, the board decided to petition McKee, as the deputy 
superintendent of Indian affairs, to acquire these lands from the Aboriginal popu-
lation.78 The lands in the area were already of interest to senior colonial officials. 
In August 1789, the governor general instructed Sir John Johnson, superintendent 
of the Indian Department to
give the necessary directions to enable Mr. McKee to treat and agree with the Indians in 
the District of Hess, who may lay claims to pretensions to a track of land: beginning at 
the western boundary of the last purchase made by the Crown from the Indians west of 
Niagara, and extending along the whole, or such part of the borders of Lake Erie, and the 
Straight of Detroit, up to such distance towards Lake Huron, and to such a depth from the 
shore as the Land Board of Hess shall see expedient to be set apart for settlement, and as 
it shall be found proper to treat for with the Indians consistently with their comforts … 
and it is my desire that they be fully satisfied for what they may cede, and transfer to the 
Crown in the usual manner.79
On May 19, 1790, McKee organized a gathering at Chenail Écarté for the purpose of 
securing a cession of land by various members of Pottawatomi, Huron, Chippewa, 
and Ottawa groups inhabiting the area, mostly settled around Walpole Island. The 
negotiations for the surrender of the lands in question appear to have been fairly 
straightforward with the Aboriginal groups agreeing to part with the described 
lands for £1,200 worth of goods, with the only caveat that specific reserve lands 
be set aside along the Detroit River, known as the Anderdon and Huron Church 
reserves which McKee noted were village sites.80 With the majority of the lands 
described by the treaty already being encroached or illegally sold by Aboriginal 
chiefs to settlers and military officers, the 1790 agreement was largely a legal 
confirmation of the reality in the area. As Victor Lytwyn and Dean Jacobs note, 
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the Aboriginal leadership was growing increasingly discontented with settler 
encroachment and may have expected that by formally ceding these lands, the 
Crown would better control settlement.81
While McKee did secure a treaty for the lands described by the land board, 
he also agreed to maintain the two small reserves, much to the displeasure of the 
board. These reserves were viewed as impediments to local settlement. William 
Robertson, an influential member of the land board and signatory to the treaty, 
stated that he believed the treaty fell short of what the land board had requested, 
was not what they believed had been negotiated, and would impede settlement 
of the area.82 In his reply to the complaints, McKee stressed that the setting aside 
of the two reserves was a non-negotiable item for the Aboriginal chiefs. Further-
more, he pointed out that the governor general had instructed him that “all possible 
regard shall be had to the ease and comfort of the Indians.”83 Both the treaty and 
McKee’s report to the Indian Department show how in this early period of land 
cessions, the principles of the Royal Proclamation were followed. Despite the 
reserves, the lands included in the 1790 McKee Treaty correspond with the earlier 
land deeded by individuals, as well as the planning and surveying organized by 
the land board itself.
Because the discussions surrounding the negotiations were private (as confirmed 
by the Land Board of Hess’s criticism of the treaty) and were not mentioned in 
McKee’s report to Governor General Dorchester, it is necessary to go to McKee’s 
other correspondence for details of discussions. In his correspondence to the land 
board in March 1792, McKee fully acknowledged that the scope of the lands to 
be ceded had been fully debated with the chiefs.84 His correspondence leading up 
to the 1796 treaty at Chenail Écarté provides more information on the matter, as 
he states that the Aboriginal population in the area had lost a considerable amount 
of their hunting grounds through the Treaty of 1790.85 Furthermore, a March 7, 
1794, memorial signed by several Chippewa chiefs at Detroit, directly comments 
on the nature of the 1790 surrender: “We the under mentioned Indian Chiefs do 
solemnly protest, that when application was made for the land on the River La 
Tranche, for the use of Government, we unanimously consented to grant the south 
side of it, but could not with propriety give the north side, as we wanted land to 
hunt and plant upon for our sustenance.”86 In this statement, the chiefs, who only 
four years earlier had negotiated and signed the McKee Treaty, clearly stated that 
they could only hunt and gather on the north shore of the Thames River because 
they had sold the lands on the south shore to the Crown.
The treaty negotiated by Alexander McKee in 1790 follows, nearly to the letter, 
the rules and protocols established by the Royal Proclamation and subsequent 
Indian policies relating to the acquisition of Aboriginal lands. McKee, an agent 
of the Indian Department since just after the Proclamation, was well acquainted 
with the need to fairly acquire Aboriginal lands through a proper agreement. He 
negotiated a cession that covered lands already being occupied by settlers and 
where Aboriginal access had already been diminished. In his subsequent corre-
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spondence, he recognized that the Aboriginal signatories had lost access to these 
hunting grounds through sale, as did the Aboriginal leaders themselves.
2. The 1795 Chenail Écarté and the 1827 Huron Tract Treaties
Some thirty-seven years after the purchase of the lands between Lakes Erie and 
St. Clair by Alexander McKee, another agreement with the Aboriginal people 
of southern Upper Canada ceded the lands to the north, bound by the shore of 
Lake Huron and the Thames River, known as the Huron Tract. While the primary 
interest in these lands began only after the War of 1812, the lands north of the 
McKee Treaty had caught the attention of the Indian Department beginning in 
the 1790s and shed some light on the British attitudes towards Aboriginal land 
usage.
As mentioned in the examination of the 1790 Treaty, both Alexander McKee 
and Aboriginal signatories stated that Aboriginal hunting, fishing, and agricul-
ture on the ceded lands had ceased once the lands were surrendered. With the 
anticipated abandonment of all British posts in Michigan, the Indian Department 
foresaw a migration of Aboriginal people from American soil into Upper Canada. 
McKee suggested that it would be best to set aside lands for the settlement of 
these American Indians. He proposed that the lands near Walpole Island, already 
a major Aboriginal settlement, be set aside as reserve lands held under the care 
of the Crown.87 In McKee’s opinion, this reserve land, along the Chenail Écarté 
waterway, would be large enough to accommodate Aboriginal settlement and 
still allow hunting and fishing throughout. At a provisional meeting in September 
1795, McKee stated that “the Chippewas are the only Proprietors of these Lands, 
and I am Happy to state that they most readily consented to a sale thereof and 
cheerfully embraced my proposal” to establish a reserve. When members of the 
Ottawa were shown the lands of the reserve they were “extremely happy in having 
seen a country every way proper and calculated as well for Hunting as Cornfields 
and Villages.”88
In trying to get colonial approval for the September 1795 conditional agreement, 
McKee noted that as the lands in the 1790 purchase were close to Aboriginal 
hunting and fishing, the lands of the Chenail Écarté were “indeed very proper for 
planting in the Summer … and in the Spring and Fall for hunting and fishing with 
Canoes.”89 In August 1796, McKee reconvened a council at the Chenail Écarté 
and finalized the surrender of the block for the reserve lands as well as other lands 
in the area.90 During the council, he told the assembled chiefs that the Crown 
wanted to purchase a block of land on the north side of the Chenail Écarté River 
for those who wished to live under the British. He further stated that they were not 
“to consider this small strip of Lands as bought for the King’s use but for the use 
of his Indian children and you yourselves will be welcome as any others to come 
and live thereon.”91
Both McKee’s proposal and report on the treaty indicate that the reserve set 
aside was to be used as a specific settlement and hunting preserve for the area’s 
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Aboriginal population. The 1796 treaty served three different purposes. Firstly, 
it maintained the strong military alliance with the Aboriginal people of the 
Old Northwest and provided them with lands near a strategic military location. 
Secondly, it established reserve lands for the specific use of Aboriginal people for 
settlement and hunting. Finally, it assured the surrender of new lands along the 
Thames River for new British settlement in the interior of Upper Canada. While 
the anticipated migration of American Aboriginal people never materialized at 
the end of the eighteenth century, there are indications that the lands were used as 
Aboriginal hunting grounds. By 1838, Indian Affairs officials who were consider-
ing alienating the lands stated that the lands in question were sparsely settled and 
were the “Hunting Grounds of the Walpole and Chenail Écarté Indians.”92 Just as 
McKee had suggested, the reserve lands in Sombra Township became protected 
Aboriginal hunting grounds amid ever-increasing surrendered lands around it.
The practice of granting specific reserve lands through land cession treaties 
became a common one. As Allan McDougall and Lisa Philips Valentine note in 
their examination of the 1827 Huron Tract Treaty, “McKee’s vision in 1796 for 
an Aboriginal homeland stretching northward from Walpole Island through the 
Sombra [Chenail Écarté] Purchase was still evident in the reserving of a tract 
of land in the southwest corner of what became Treaty 29.”93 The four reserves 
requested in the initial 1818 agreement and confirmed in the final 1827 treaty 
served as an extension of the Sombra Township reserve, specifically the Moore 
reserve, which was contiguous to Sombra, and allowed access to hunting and 
sugaring lands.94 The inclusion of the four reserves had not been part of the initial 
offer made by John Askin, the deputy superintendent general of Indian affairs for 
the western district, but rather was a specific condition of Aboriginal signatories. 
In the October 1818 council minutes, the chiefs requested not only the creation of 
the reserves, but also that they would increase in size if “they are insufficient for 
the whole of our nation … to plant corn and hunt.”95 Just as the signatory chiefs to 
the Chenail Écarté Treaty of 1796 stated that the reserve lands would be for their 
settlement and hunting, the chiefs negotiating the Huron Tract Treaty viewed the 
reserve lands as hunting grounds, while other lands were to be completely surren-
dered. This position is consistent with the views expressed by both colonial and 
Indian Department officials who saw the treaties as bringing an end to Aboriginal 
usage and hunting over surrendered lands.
3. The 1818 Rice Lake Purchase
With the prospect of a long-lasting and secure peace with the United States 
through the 1815 Treaty of Ghent, Aboriginal people’s military role came to 
an abrupt end. Furthermore, in the fifty years since the first land cessions in the 
Great Lakes region, the settlers had come to outnumber the Aboriginal popula-
tion in Upper Canada. The Indian Department’s main focus shifted entirely to the 
purchase of Aboriginal lands for settlement. A priority for the colonial officials 
was the opening of a second line of settlement behind the initial lands along the 
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St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario surrendered at the turn of the century. In 
the decade after the War of 1812, Indian agents negotiated five treaties in Upper 
Canada.
In November 1818, William Clause, the deputy superintendent general of 
Indian affairs, negotiated a surrender of the lands in and around the Kawartha 
Lakes. The impetus of this specific land cession was for the opening of the lands 
north of Rice Lake, near what is now Peterborough. Clause was responding to a 
directive from the lieutenant-governor and governor general, who were looking to 
open more lands for settlement and to allow for greater exploitation of the lands 
in question.96 On November 5, 1818, Clause convened a council at what is now 
Port Hope on Lake Ontario with the Aboriginal chiefs “inhabiting the back parts 
of the New Castle District.” He proposed that in exchange for nearly 1.9 million 
acres of land, covering the majority of the Kawartha Lakes, the Aboriginal signa-
tories would receive an annuity of £740 “to be well & truly paid, yearly, and every 
year.”97 During the discussions, the principal chief, Bucquaqet, commented on the 
destitute nature of his people and said that their hunting had been ruined by the 
advancing settlements. He went on to ask that the islands in the territory be set 
aside as reserves and that hunting and fishing be allowed to continue in the ceded 
lands. In his response, Clause indicated that the islands would surely be set aside 
as reserves and that the rivers were open to all for hunting and fishing.98
There has been considerable discussion on the continuing right to hunt and fish 
stemming from this treaty. As Peter Schmalz mentions in his study, The Ojibwa 
of Southern Ontario, the language used by Clause during the treaty negotiations 
appears to allow a limited continuance of rights to hunt and fish instead of a 
complete cession of those rights, as is the case in the 1790 McKee Treaty.99 In 
his report of the November 1818 council meeting, Clause reports the following 
exchange between Chief Bucquaqet and himself:
Bucquaqet: Father. We hope that we shall not be prevented from the right of Fishing, the 
use of the Waters & Hunting where we can find game ...
Father. We do not say that we must have the Islands, but we hope our Father will think of 
us & allow us this small request.
clause: Children … The request for the Islands, I shall also inform him of, & have no 
doubt but that he will accede to your wish. The Rivers are open to all & you have an equal 
right to fish & hunt on them.100
This reference to a continued right to hunt and fish on the water is one of particu-
lar interest to this study. While it does appear to be a direct promise maintain-
ing these rights, it is also linked to the question of the aforementioned islands to 
be set aside as reserve lands. On several occasions, Indian Department officials 
have made direct links between Aboriginal usage and reserve lands, as was done 
in the 1796 Chenail Écarté Treaty. As on other occasions, it was expected that 
Aboriginal people would use these lands for such activities as fishing or hunting. 
The case here in 1818 is not necessarily much different. In this case, Clause may 
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well have implied that the Aboriginal population could use the islands as they 
needed them, including for hunting and fishing, which is consistent with other 
treaty negotiations. It is also apparent that the scope of the rights may well be 
broader than Clause had originally intended. By stating that the rights applied to 
the water as well, Clause appears to have extended that right onto the waterway. 
This argument was presented in the 1979 Ontario Supreme Court in the Taylor 
and Williams case, which argued successfully that Clause had promised that very 
right.101
The circumstances of the 1818 Rice Lake Purchase are not markedly different 
from the other land cessions of the period. The Crown was continuing its practice 
to purchase Aboriginal lands so they could become settlement lands. Clause, 
acting as the Crown representative, followed the tenants and principles estab-
lished by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to acquire Aboriginal hunting grounds. 
Bucquaqet’s request to be allowed to hunt and fish appears to be an attempt to 
hold off starvation “where we [his people] can find game.”102 For Clause and 
the Indian Department, this concession is consistent with the existing practice of 
allowing hunting and fish on reserve lands, in this case, the island reserves.
Conclusion
Between 1764 and 1862, the agents of the Indian Department negotiated thirty-
two land cession treaties with the Aboriginal people of the Great Lakes Basin. The 
protocols and procedures for negotiating and concluding these agreements were 
based upon the policies set out by the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The Proclama-
tion, as a response to prior abuses, states that only Crown officials could acquire 
Aboriginal hunting grounds in an open and fair process. Senior colonial officials 
attempted to maintain tight control on any land purchases so as to protect Aborig-
inal access to their unceded hunting lands and maintain the lucrative British-
Aboriginal fur trade, as well as strengthen the all-important military alliances in 
the undefended interior. While the protection of Aboriginal interest was part of the 
larger colonial perspective, the need for new settlement lands was just as pressing. 
The need for land, however, at least in the earlier period, needed to be balanced 
with protecting the military alliances. Governors and senior officials all advocated 
the protection of Aboriginal hunting grounds through an orderly and controlled 
series of land cessions.
The language and wording of instructions demonstrate the Crown’s under-
standing of the land cession treaties. In the twenty-year period between the Royal 
Proclamation and the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the correspondence to the Indian 
Department specifically instructed the protection of Aboriginal rights by limiting 
encroachment. Squatters were seen as disrupting Aboriginal hunting and fishing 
because these lands had yet to be ceded to the Crown. Only when those hunting 
lands were sold to the Crown could settlement proceed. This need to acquire lands 
prior to settlement was the basis for both protecting and extinguishing hunting and 
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fishing rights in Upper Canada. Indian Department officials attempted to prevent 
encroachment of hunting grounds on the one hand, while negotiating surrenders, 
which, in their view, ceded all rights and title to the Crown on the other. In the 
four examples of Upper Canada Land Surrenders presented, the understanding 
that Aboriginal hunting and fishing rights were extinguished on surrendered land 
is demonstrated. In all cases, the Indian Department officials reported that hunting 
and fishing would only be permitted on the lands set aside as reserve lands. In 
the case of the 1790 McKee Treaty, the Aboriginal leadership corroborated this 
understanding when they stated four years later that they could only hunt on the 
lands to the north of the cession. In both the 1796 Chenail Écarté and 1827 Huron 
Tract treaties, the council minutes show that the Indian agent informed the signing 
chiefs that the lands set aside as reserves were to be used as their exclusive hunting 
grounds. Similarly, the negotiations for the 1818 Rice Lake Purchase indicate that 
the Indian agent agreed that hunting and fishing could continue on the islands that 
were to be set aside as reserves for the Aboriginal signatories.
In the two centuries since the signing of the Upper Canada Land Surrender 
treaties, the position of both the British and Canadian governments has remained 
unchanged: these treaties cede all rights and title to the Crown unless otherwise 
specified by the text. While these four case studies do seem to indicate a rela-
tively consistent policy regarding the nature of these land cession treaties, further 
research into all thirty-two treaties in Upper Canada would help determine if there 
were any differences in the Crown’s approach or language used. As each treaty was 
negotiated under somewhat different circumstances by different Indian agents, it 
may become apparent that the Crown’s overall perspective was not expressed 
as clearly as it could have been in all circumstances. It would also be useful to 
examine the tactics and approaches used by Crown officials to achieve successful 
cessions. Lastly, it may be useful to examine how the position and understanding 
of Aboriginal signatories evolved during this period, as the number of settlers 
grew and Aboriginal hunting lands became increasingly scarce.
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